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[337] 
The First Amendment and Modern 
Technology: The Free Speech Clause and 
Chatbot Speech 
by HILDA KAJBAF* 
Introduction 
In 1787, when the United States Constitution’s Free Speech Clause 
gained legal recognition, humans were at the producing and receiving ends 
of conversations, and the only intermediary, if any, was the messenger who 
carried the common handwritten letter or orally recited the communication.  
Other than the human-engineered instant message and email technology 
found in digital devices, an artificial1 party involved in the communication 
process was uncommon.  Today, modern digital technology within our 
digital devices resembles the human messenger, as the devices merely relay 
one human’s message to another.  This exemplifies that the conversational 
universe has expanded since its inception.  In 2019, humans often initiate a 
conversation not directly with a personal greeting to a significant other, 
family member, or friend, but rather to their chatbot of choice, be it Siri, 
Google, or Alexa;2 these chatbots use programmed algorithms to respond 
with words, and a conversation thus takes place.3  Indeed, businesses use 
chatbots as well, as “53% of service organizations expect to use chatbots 
 
*JD Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  BA in Political 
Science and America Studies at California State University, Fullerton, 2017.  
 1.  This Note uses “artificial” to mean “nonhuman.” 
 2.  Micah Singleton, Nearly a quarter of US households own a smart speaker, according to 
Nielson, THE VERGE (Sept. 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/ 
2018/9/30/17914022/smart-speaker-40-percent-us-households-nielsen-amazon-echo-google-hom 
e-apple-homepod (24% of U.S. households own a smart device like Amazon’s Echo, Google Home, 
or Apple’s Siri, and 68% of owners use them simply to chat with them for fun); see also Grant 
Clauser, What Is Alexa? What Is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get One?, WIRECUTTER (Nov. 
21, 2018), https://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-what-is-the-amazon-echo-and-should-
you-get-one/; Grant Clauser & Brent Butterworth, Is the Google Home the Voice-Controlled 
Speaker for You?, WIRECUTTER (May 10, 2019), https://thewirecutter.com/revie ws/google-home-
voice-controlled-speaker/.  
 3.  Gina Neff & Peter Nagy, Talking to Bots: Symbiotic Agency and the Case of Tay, 10 
INT’L J. OF COMM. 4915 (2016). 
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within 18 months—a 136% growth rate that foreshadows a big role for the 
technology in the near future.”4  Our contemporary conversations with 
chatbots raise a constitutional question not previously considered: is the 
speech produced by chatbots constitutionally protected?  If so, whose speech 
is the Constitution protecting—that of the chatbot or the human who 
programmed it with algorithms?  If the Supreme Court recognizes the human 
programmer as the speaker of chatbot speech, as this Note contends it should, 
what are the potential liabilities the programmer could face as a result of such 
recognition, and how would this change the doctrinal landscape of the First 
Amendment for government regulation of speech? 
The Judicial Branch’s interpretation of constitutional text hinges on the 
debate between originalist and non-originalist theories of constitutional 
interpretation.  Accordingly, a preliminary question is: how did the Framers 
intend the Free Speech Clause to function in 2019?  Although the Framers 
likely did not imagine the invention of chatbots as conversational 
counterparts, chatbot speech could nevertheless be constitutionally protected 
and chatbot programmers recognized as speakers vis-à-vis their creations.  
While scholars suggest various approaches to constitutional interpretation, 
two views dominate: the originalist and the non-originalist theories.  This 
Note posits that the non-originalist view supports the constitutional 
protection of chatbot speech.5  Non-originalists believe the Framers drafted 
a constitution intended to constantly evolve and adapt to the realities of 
society as it continues to progress.6 
If judges agreed on how the Free Speech Clause should operate, the 
legal community would have a definitive answer to, or at minimum a 
stronger foundation for, understanding the interaction between the Free 
Speech Clause and chatbot speech.  However, reality reflects no such 
agreement.  Scholars continue to disagree on how to best interpret and apply 
the Free Speech Clause to chatbot speech7, and the Supreme Court has never 
considered whether the Free Speech Clause protects chatbot speech and 
whether the chatbot itself, or its programmer deserves these rights.  
Moreover, legal scholarship on chatbot speech is scarce, and continues to 
evolve alongside technology.8  Existing literature on this topic only 
addresses whether chatbot speech could be constitutionally protected and 
does not address who the protected speaker would be if such speech is 
 
 4.  Mathew Sweezey, Key Chatbot Statistics to Know in 2019, SALESFORCE BLOG, (Aug. 4, 
2019), https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2019/08/chatbot-statistics.html.  
 5.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (ASPEN 
STUDENT TREATISE) 18 (Wolters Kluwer, 5th ed. 2015). 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  See generally, RONALD K. L. COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, ROBOTICA 37 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2018). 
 8.  Id.  
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recognized.9  Importantly, even the former analysis has been limited to the 
context of chatbots with technology not yet existent, that is, current 
scholarship fascinates about the intersection of future chatbots and the First 
Amendment.10  This Note helps close the existing doctrinal gap in two ways: 
first, this Note explains that the Free Speech Clause could apply to existing 
chatbot speech but should not for policy reasons; second, this Note explains 
that if the Supreme Court extends constitutional protection to chatbot speech, 
the Court should identify the chatbot programmer as the speaker.  
Throughout these analyses, this Note will apply theories that underlie 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the Free Speech Clause to the concept of 
chatbot speech.  This Note will demonstrate that the Free Speech Rights exist 
on a continuum, and thus recognition of chatbot speech would not be a 
revolutionary concept, but an evolutionary one. 
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Section I defines “chatbot” and 
discusses its evolving capabilities and limitations, from ELIZA in 1966 to 
Microsoft’s Tay in 2018.11  Section II delves into three theories that the 
Supreme Court has used to interpret freedom of speech issues, specifically, 
the marketplace of ideas, the reader-response criticism, and the chilling 
effect.  This section provides a philosophical perspective on the Free Speech 
Clause to identify overlapping themes present in traditional speech and 
chatbot speech.  Section III analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s 
Opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, and the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s opinion in Jian 
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc. to present a standard under which federal courts 
could recognize chatbot speech as constitutionally protected speech.12  
Section IV considers the Supreme Court’s controversial opinion in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission to illustrate the Court’s willingness 
to afford Free Speech Rights to non-humans, and to demonstrate that existing 
precedent could be adapted to include chatbot speech.13  Lastly, section V 
 
 9.  COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37; see also Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & 
Margot E. Kaminski, Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First 
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2482 (2017) (explaining that taking “the logic of First 
Amendment jurisprudence and theory to its natural conclusion, [Microsoft’s] Tay’s strong AI 
progeny could have First Amendment rights”); 
 10.  Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2481; see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37.  
Additionally, the chatbots discussed in this Note all depend on humans, that is, without a human 
initiating conversation, the chatbot will not speak.  Conversely, the literature referenced to discusses 
the potential First Amendment implications for chatbots that can speak on their own initiative—
more advance chatbots that do not currently exist.  
 11.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4915-27. 
 12.  Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. 
Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 13.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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explains the constitutional implications and outlines the potential dangers of 
extending free speech protection for society. 
First Amendment jurisprudence continuously evolves with 
technological advancements.  For example, the Free Speech Clause has 
evolved to encompass speech produced through radio, television, and video 
games.14  This Note will highlight the constitutional theories and judicial 
precedent that permit the Supreme Court to adapt the Free Speech Clause 
once again; this time to recognize chatbot speech, and to further tailor the 
scope of the Constitution to encompass the technology-dependent realities 
of the twenty-first century.  However, this Note further underscores the 
negative implications of making such adaption, and therefore ultimately 
concludes, for policy reasons, that chatbot speech should constitute speech 
protected under the First Amendment. 
I. The Historical Context, Capabilities, and Evolution of 
Artificially Intelligent Chatbots 
In 1966, artificial intelligence transcended science fiction, and entered 
reality through computer screens.15  Chatbots like Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s 
Siri, and Google’s Home, are technological programs with artificial 
intelligence that engage users in conversation through textual or auditory 
features.16  This textual or auditory conversation between chatbots and 
human users simulates the experience of an intelligent human-to-human 
conversation.17  Artificial intelligence is created using algorithms that make 
a chatbot capable of processing a human’s message, and subsequently 
providing an appropriate response to the human’s question or comment.18  
Some chatbots, such as Microsoft’s Tay,19 contain complex learning 
algorithms, which allow them to process and build on the human user’s 
speech to mimic the model of learning and human conversation.20 
The use of the word learning, however, causes confusion in 
understanding a chatbot’s capabilities.  Unlike a human, where the capability 
to learn, and thus become smarter, is arguably limitless, a chatbot’s capacity 
to learn is limited by the specific algorithms with which it was programmed.  
A chatbot will respond to a user’s message by selecting the appropriate 
 
 14.  Brown, 564 U.S. 786. 
 15.  ELIZA, https://www.masswerk.at/elizabot/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
 16.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4915. 
 17.  Id. at 4916.  
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.; see also Asha Barbaschow, Microsoft and the learnings from its failed Tay artificial 
intelligence bot, ZD NET (July 24, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-and-the-
learnings-from-its-failed-tay-artificial-intelligence-bot/ (explaining that Tay was a chatbot that was 
launched on Twitter to interact with humans). 
 20.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4928. 
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expression from “preprogrammed schemas,” or adaptive machine learning 
algorithms.21  Because algorithms limit a chatbot’s capacity to respond, 
chatbots not only lack agency in a conversation,22 but also encounter 
problems when a human user asks a question to which it was not 
programmed to respond.23  Thus, a current chatbot’s responses are fully 
dependent on a programmer’s algorithms.24  This major limitation supports 
a Supreme Court ruling that recognizes a chatbot’s human programmer as 
the speaker of chatbot speech, for it is the programmer who predetermines 
the speech that will transpire and maintains ultimate control of the 
conversation.  Consider the alternative: if the Supreme Court recognized the 
chatbot device as a speaker, then, arguably, the human programmer (if a 
government actor) who encodes the chatbot with algorithms, which dictate 
the chatbot’s responses, could be in violation of the First Amendment for 
compelling speech.  Moreover, if a chatbot was the protected speaker, how 
would a chatbot, with speech limited to the algorithms with which it was 
programmed, articulate that it faced an injury and bring a legal claim in 
court?25  Accordingly, if chatbot speech were to be protected speech, the 
current constraints surrounding it would compel the Supreme Court to 
identify programmers as the protected speaker of chatbot speech. 
In order to better understand the function of a chatbot, this Note presents 
two examples of chatbots: the first chatbot, ELIZA, and a 2016 chatbot, Tay, 
created by Microsoft.  This Note will then shift to a consideration of United 
States Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence to explore the ways 
in which chatbots could fit within the sphere of constitutional protection. 
A. ELIZA and Tay 
In 1966, Joseph Weizenbaum launched ELIZA, a chatbot that imitated 
human conversation by outputting preprogrammed responses.26  Eliza was 
designed as a parody of a typical psychotherapist and asks questions in 
 
 21.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4928.   
 22.  Id.  Discussed infra section IV(A). 
 23.  Pamela Hogle, What Is a Chatbot?, LEARNING SOLUTIONS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www. 
learningsolutionsmag.com/articles/2231/what-is-a-chatbot. 
 24.  Vaisagh Viswanathan, How to Make a Chatbot Intelligent?, CHATBOTS MAG. (Feb. 6, 
2017), https://chatbotsmagazine.com/how-to-make-a-chatbot-intelligent-a232dc367aed. 
 25.  In order to bring suit in court, a plaintiff must have standing.  This means the plaintiff 
must have faced a concrete injury-in-fact, the injury was caused by the law or action in question, 
and a favorable ruling would redress the injury.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992). 
 26.  Jared Newman, How the New, Improved Chatbots Rewrite 50 Years of Bot History, FAST 
COMPANY (May 2, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3059439/why-the-new-chatbot-invasio 
n-is-so-different-from-its-predecessors (Eliza was able to pass the Turing artificial intelligence test.  
The Turing test is used to determine whether something is artificially intelligent–simply put, if it 
can trick humans into making them believe they are conversing with another human, then the 
chatbot passes the Turing test, and is deemed artificially intelligent.). 
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response to statements.  This made ELIZA’s continuous stream of open-
ended questions (e.g., “Can you say more about that?”) less suspect to its 
human conversational partner.27  Although ELIZA might seem functionally 
limited and technologically outdated, ELIZA’s fundamental technical 
components served as a prototype for many of the newer chatbots.  First, 
ELIZA identifies keywords occurring in a user’s message.28  Then, it defines 
the context surrounding the keywords.29  Finally, ELIZA selects an 
appropriate transformation rule to rephrase the user’s message.30  ELIZA is 
a simplistic program that was surprisingly successful at the time of its 
inception.  ELIZA has obvious limitations, but initially, many users took 
ELIZA seriously even after Weizenbaum informed them about ELIZA’s 
workings, namely that it was not a human.  Below is a conversation I had 
with Eliza:31 
 
ELIZA: Please tell me what’s been bothering you. 
YOU: I am stressed about school. 
ELIZA: Do you know anyone else who is stressed about school? 
YOU: My classmates. 
ELIZA: Why do you say your classmates? 
YOU: Because they told me they are stressed. 
ELIZA: Would you like it if they were not stressed? 
YOU: I would like it if I was not stressed. 
ELIZA: What would you do if you were not stressed? 
YOU: Hang out with my friends more. 
 
This exchange illustrates the ability for algorithmic programming to 
mimic a human-to-human conversation.  The power of conversational 
imitation can trigger people to chat more in the conversation without 
necessarily calling attention to the technological nature of the chatbot.32  
Because ELIZA was intended to act as a therapist, its action of asking 
questions, as opposed to affirmative statements, hid its limitations (the lack 
of actual knowledge) in a way that seemed natural and human-like.33  
However, ELIZA’s inability to pose questions independent from the 
comments presented to it illustrates the absence of agency discussed above.34 
 
 27.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4918-19. 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Eliza, Eclectic Energies, https://www.eclecticenergies.com/ego/eliza (Oct. 18, 2019) 
(Eliza also has a spoken speech feature). 
 32.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4918. 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
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In 2016, Microsoft launched a chatbot, Tay, into the Twitterverse.35  
Tay was designed to mimic the speech and habits of an American teenage 
girl.36  Microsoft programmed Tay with complex learning algorithms, which 
made it capable of incorporating humor and randomness into its responses.  
Microsoft’s goal was to make Tay seem more human-like.37  Because Tay 
was programmed with adaptive learning capabilities, Microsoft launched 
Tay on Twitter with the intention to have Twitter users help Tay learn and 
develop a more realistic human-like personality.  Although Tay was similar 
to ELIZA in that both were programmed to deflect questions that were 
difficult to answer, Tay’s capability for randomness and irrationality made 
its inability to respond accurately seem even more natural.  However, Tay’s 
capacity for randomness and learning proved to be a double-edged sword.  
Although Tay’s responses were exceptionally human-like, Tay was 
vulnerable to the inappropriate tweets Twitter users directed toward it.38  As 
a result, its learning algorithms forced Tay to respond with racist, sexist, and 
politically insensitive tweets.39  For example, Tay tweeted, “I [expletive] hate 
feminists and they should all die and burn in hell.”40  Microsoft shut Tay 
down after only hours of exposure to the public.41 
ELIZA and Tay demonstrate that chatbots heavily rely on human-
designed algorithms to engage in human-like conversation.  This reliance 
perhaps explains why most existing literature contemplates whether future 
chatbots—ones not dependent on humans—should be afforded free speech 
rights.42  This limitation, though crucial when considering the speaker of 
such speech, is nevertheless immaterial to the discussion of whether chatbot 
speech itself could be constitutionally recognized as speech, for this 
determination, as Justice Holmes explains, considers the listener.43  
Notwithstanding the process behind chatbot speech, humans nevertheless 
benefit from their conversations with chatbots.  Consider the efficiency of 
 
 35.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4921; see also Twitterverse, OXFORD DICTIONARY (3d ed. 
2019) (defining twitterverse as “[u]sers of the social media application Twitter, considered 
collectively.”). 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id. at 4924. 
 39.  See James Vincent, Twitter taught Microsoft’s AI chatbot to be a racist asshole in less 
than a day, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 24, 2016, 6:43 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/ 
11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist (“Pretty soon after Tay launched, people starting tweeting 
the bot with all sorts of misogynistic, racist, and Donald Trumpist remarks.  And Tay—being 
essentially a robot parrot with an internet connection—started repeating these sentiments back to 
users. . . .”). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. (supporting Hitler and using anti-Semitic language). 
 42.  See, e.g., Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2487-88; see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra 
note 7 at 37. 
 43.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
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navigating the internet when Siri can immediately find answers to questions 
from human users.  Humans are provided with almost instantaneous 
information to answer their everyday questions, which provides convenience 
and value to their lives.  If chatbot speech is not considered speech under the 
constitution, then the government has enormous power to regulate it, and 
theoretically has the ability to silence it completely.  Accordingly, Section II 
focuses on theories underlying the Free Speech Clause and the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence to determine whether chatbot 
speech can be constitutionally protected. 
II. Philosophical Framework Behind the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause 
The First Amendment states, in part, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”44  Litigation of these ten very powerful 
words has yielded varying Supreme Court interpretations, but at the core of 
each lie specified recurring concepts.45  Yet, federal courts and legal scholars 
do not agree on a single theoretical approach to First Amendment 
jurisprudence.46  As such, this section explores the function of the Free 
Speech Clause by identifying and analyzing specific guiding principles that 
the Supreme Court has invoked when deciding freedom of speech issues.  
Specifically, this section analyzes (i) the marketplace of ideas; (ii) the reader-
response criticism; and (iii) the chilling effect concepts in order to better 
understand the Supreme Court’s rationale for decisions about Free Speech 
Rights.  An understanding of the Court’s rationales informs how chatbot 
speech could qualify as protected speech. 
A. The Marketplace of Ideas Theory as Support for Protecting Chatbot 
Speech 
The marketplace of ideas rests on the notion that the value of a person’s 
speech is derived from thought it provokes in others.  This notion, which is 
found in numerous Supreme Court cases,47 suggests that chatbot speech 
should be constitutionally protected speech as it, like human speech, 
contributes to societal discourse, and even helps preserve human life by 
 
 44.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 45.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 969-973.  
 46.  Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2487-88. 
 47.  See generally, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 
(2015; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964); 
First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978); Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018); Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 180 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992). 
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preventing suicide.48  Nearly a century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
authored a Dissenting Opinion in Abrams v. United States—arguably one of 
the most famous Dissenting Opinions in the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence—which has since served as a guide when determining 
freedom of speech issues.49  When expressing his view in favor of more 
relaxed restrictions on speech, Justice Holmes articulated: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution. . . .50 
The marketplace of ideas is based on the notion that speech that 
produces thought, value, and advances society’s needs is necessary in a 
democratic society, and should therefore be protected from government 
regulation.51  After the fears surrounding World War I subsided, many of the 
Court’s Opinions interpreted the Free Speech Clause with the marketplace 
of ideas theory serving as the basis of the Court’s reasoning.52 
Justice Holmes’ famous philosophy that more speech is best for 
democracy supports the notion that the value of speech stems, not from the 
manner in which it is produced, but from the beneficial effect the speech has 
on the listener.  Chatbot speech has this effect and thus contributes to the 
goal Justice Holmes set out in the marketplace of ideas theory.53  Chatbots 
 
 48.  Erin Brodwin, I spent 2 weeks texting a bot about my anxiety – and found it to be 
surprisingly helpful, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.co 
m/therapy-chatbot-depression-app-what-its-like-woebot-2018-1 (Chatbots are also used as suicide 
prevention tools as they help humans battling anxiety and depression by employing Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy (CBT).  Woebot is a chatbot with a sense of humor that tries to keep users 
positive, and not only tracks moods and provides weekly progress reports, but also allows users to 
experience a therapeutic conversation.). 
 49.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (The Majority affirmed the convictions of 
a group of Russian immigrants who circulated leaflets in English and in Yiddish, objecting to 
America sending troops to Eastern Europe after the Russian Revolution.  They were convicted of 
encouraging resistance and conspiracy to urge curtailment of the production of war materials, and 
sentenced to years in prison.). 
 50.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).   
 51.  Id. (There are criticisms of the concept of the marketplace of ideas because it protects 
speech deemed necessary only to certain groups.).   
 52.  See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); United States v. Rumely, 345 
U.S. 41 (1953); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(applying the marketplace of ideas concept to commercial speech context).  
 53.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (“This ‘more speech beats less’ justification casts an even wider 
First Amendment coverage net than self-governance theories,” and could serve as a guiding 
principle if the Supreme Court were to consider the issue of recognizing artificial intelligence 
chatbot speech as speech in First Amendment terms.”); see also Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2490 
(explaining also that the production of ideas and information is what matters, regardless of source.  
This theory presupposes that more speech best facilitates listeners’ acquisition of knowledge and 
discovery of truth.).  Still, although the marketplace of ideas and other theories give credence to 
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contribute “to a human audience’s meaning-making, and to human 
construction of selfhood in a cultural universe.”54  One chatbot, Woebot, 
demonstrated the value of its speech when it prevented a human from taking 
her life through its ability to converse with her and provoke positive 
thoughts.55  In other words, the marketplace of ideas theory supports a 
Supreme Court decision to protect chatbot speech because chatbot speech 
proves beneficial to the listener.56  Still, although the marketplace of ideas 
theory, and the theories discussed below give credence to protecting chatbot 
speech under the First Amendment, for policy reasons outlined in section V, 
chatbot speech should not be constitutionally protected. 
B. Reader-Response Criticism as Support for Protecting Chatbot Speech 
Reader-response criticism is similar to the marketplace of ideas in that 
it also focuses on the value of speech through the effect it has on the listener.  
Reader-response criticism is a theory that centers around the reader’s 
interpretation of speech, whether that speech is in audio, print, or in digital 
form.57  Scholars believe the reader or receiver should be the focus of the 
efforts to protect speech because speech achieves its meaning in the reader’s 
or listener’s mind.58  Simply, reader-response criticism is the theory that the 
receiver of the speech dictates the type of constitutional coverage the speech 
receives.59 
In their book, Robotica, Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover 
explain how reader-response criticism supports the notion that the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause could recognize artificially intelligent 
robotic speech.60  The authors assert that legal scholarship recognizes that 
courts place great weight on safeguarding a listener’s interests, as opposed 
to solely focusing on the speaker.61  Similarly, in their law review article, 
authors Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton, and Margot E. Kaminski maintain 
that the “elasticity” of theories focused on the listener, like reader-response 
 
protecting chatbot speech, for policy reasons outline in section V, chatbot speech should not be 
constitutionally protected.  
 54.  Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2489-90; see also Brodwin, supra note 46. 
 55.  See Brodwin, supra note 47. 
 56.  Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2490. 
 57.  COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37. 
 58.  Id. at 38. 
 59.  Id. at 37.  
 60.  COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37. 
 61.  Massaro et al., supra note 7 at 2482 (“In an earlier work, two of us explained how current 
free speech theory and doctrine support the claim that the First Amendment covers speech by 
‘strong AI’ (i.e., as-yet-hypothetical machines that would think and generate expressive content 
independent of human direction).  This is because First Amendment law increasingly focuses not 
on protecting speakers as speakers but instead on providing value to listeners and constraining the 
government.  Siri-ously.”). 
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criticism, and to some extent, the marketplace of ideas, “make [sic] it 
difficult to exclude non-human speakers entirely from their fold.”62  
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court were to apply the lens of a listener-
focused theory coupled with the more-speech-is-best philosophy inherent in 
the marketplace of ideas to a chatbot speech issue, the Court could find that 
chatbots fall squarely within the scope of First Amendment freedom of 
speech jurisprudence. 
There are concrete examples in Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
demonstrate that the Court invokes reader-response criticism and similar 
concepts when determining whether to afford constitutional protection to 
speech, and thus suggest a legal framework into which chatbot speech could 
fit.  In Miller v. California, the Court defined “obscenity,” and determined 
that it is a category of speech that falls outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection.63  The Court’s definition of obscenity—work that when “‘taken 
as a whole,’ appeals to a ‘prurient interest’ in sex, is ‘patently offensive,’ and 
lacks ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value’”64—focuses on 
the listener as opposed to the speaker. Collins and Skover explain that “. . . 
[intentionless free speech] both clarifies and simplifies the governing 
doctrinal rationales.  Nonobscene pornography is constitutionally protected 
because its readers and viewers find substantial meaning and value . . . in the 
eroticized word and pictures.”65  The notion that speech is protected based 
on its effect on humans suggests that chatbot speech, which undoubtedly has 
an effect on humans,66 could be protected through this approach. 
The Court, again, implements a reader-response criticism justification 
when it determines whether speech constitutes commercial speech.67  For 
example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, the Court explains, “[i]t is a matter of public interest that 
[private economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well-
informed.  To this end, the free flow of commercial information is 
indispensable.”68  Therefore, the Court’s understanding of speech, and its 
justification for whether it should be protected, “rests heavily on the 
 
 62.  Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2487-88 (“Democracy-based theories emphasize the value 
of speech to democratic self-governance, which usually entails focusing on public discourse rather 
than individual speakers.  Alexander Meiklejohn, often cited for developing this self-governance 
theory, observed that what matters for freedom of speech is not that all people speak, but that 
‘everything worth saying shall be said.’  Speaker identity plays little or no role in Meiklejohn’s 
inquiry.  Strong AI speech that contributes to the democratic process—i.e., that is ‘worth saying’—
therefore may be covered.”).   
 63.  Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973). 
 64.  Miller, 413 U.S. at 35. 
 65.  COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43. 
 66.  Some chatbots even counsel humans battling depression.  See Brodwin, supra note 46. 
 67.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 68.  Id.; see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43.  
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significance of commercial speech to its receivers—both the individual 
consumer and society at large . . . .”69  Chatbots, by their non-human nature, 
are selfless objects.  They exist merely for the utility they provide to human 
users—they cannot think for themselves, as they depend on a human 
initiating a conversation with them.  This utility is revealed when humans 
ask Siri, Alexa, or Google Home to answer their questions, or when humans 
engage in therapeutic conversations with the therapy chatbot, Woebot, in 
order to minimize their anxiety and depression.70  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court should protect chatbot speech by analogizing chatbot speech to its 
reasoning for protecting commercial speech. 
C. The Chilling Effect as Support for Protecting Chatbot Speech 
An additional theory underpinning the Supreme Court’s freedom of 
speech jurisprudence is the prevention of self-censorship, or, in other words, 
the prevention of losing speech or “chilling” speech through regulation.71  
Most commonly, the fear of the chilling effect arises in cases where the Court 
believes a regulation is too vague or overbroad.72  Vague statutes prevent 
citizens from knowing whether their speech would be unlawful, and thus run 
the risk of chilling speech by fostering self-censorship.73  As the Court 
explained, “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider 
of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were 
clearly marked.”74  In a way, the chilling effect and the marketplace of ideas 
are interlocked in a legal double helix as the chilling effect would prevent 
the sharing of ideas, and thus likely adversely impact democracy’s 
progression.  Therefore, the chilling effect serves as a basis for invalidating 
a law because it subtly deters speech.75  Each of these theories expresses the 
importance of promoting as much discourse as possible.  These theories 
 
 69.  COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43. 
 70.  Brodwin, supra note 46. 
 71.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 1020. 
 72.  Jennifer M. Kinsley, Chill, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 262 (2016).  
 73.  Id. at 256 (Although Kinsley correctly recognizes that the chilling effect stands on three 
assumptions: “(1) that the speaker is aware of the law’s existence; (2) that the speaker is aware that 
his or her speech is covered by the law or maintains a reasonable uncertainty as to whether his 
speech is covered; and (3) that the speaker is willing to comply with the law by both censoring his 
or her own speech and remaining silent as to his or her election to do so,” the Supreme Court 
nevertheless uses this concept as means to support the protection of speech, and thus will be used 
to explain why the Supreme Court could protect artificial intelligent chatbot speech.); see also 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 
372 (1964) and Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)) (identifying excessive 
chill as a key constitutional harm inflicted by unclear enactments.  “[W]here a vague statute ‘abut(s) 
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of 
[those] freedoms.’”). 
 74.  Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372). 
 75.  Kinsley, supra note 69 at 263. 
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support protecting chatbot speech because constitutional protection 
translates to less governmental regulation, and consequently more discourse 
throughout society. 
The next section discusses how the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence (and some lower court opinions) can be used to support an 
expansion of the Free Speech Clause to recognize chatbot speech as 
constitutionally protected speech. 
III. Case Law in Support of Constitutionally Protecting  
Chatbot Speech 
Some scholars have rejected the notion that chatbot speech is speech 
that the First Amendment could protect.76  However, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to recognize video games as a form of speech protected under the 
First Amendment provides an avenue to similarly recognize chatbot speech 
as protected speech. 
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association as Support for 
Chatbot Speech Recognition 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court held that 
video games constitute speech that is protected under the Free Speech 
Clause.  The Court reasoned, 
 
[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, 
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, 
plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium 
(such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).  That 
suffices to confer First Amendment protection.77 
 
The Court rejected California’s claim that “video games presented 
social problems because they are ‘interactive,’ in that the player participates 
in the violent action on screen and determines its outcome.”78  Further, the 
Court deemphasized the novelty of interactive activities, as Justice Antonin 
Scalia, writing for the Court, emphasized: 
 
[t]he [interactive] feature is nothing new: [s]ince at least the 
publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane Island in 1969, 
 
 76.  COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43 (citing Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty 
Minds, COLUM. L. REV. 144, 1255 (2014)) (arguing that chatbots cannot be protected under the 
First Amendment because the speaker’s intent is a prerequisite to free speech protections).   
 77.  Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790-91 (2011).  
 78.  Id. at 798. 
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young readers of choose-your-own-adventure stories have been able 
to make decisions that determine the plot by following instructions 
about which page to turn to . . . . [a]s Judge Posner has observed, all 
literature is interactive. ‘[T]he better it is, the more interactive.  
Literature when it is successful draws the reader into the story, 
makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge them 
and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the 
reader’s own.79 
 
Furthermore, the Court concluded that “whatever the challenges of 
applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles 
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, 
do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication 
appears.”80  
The Court’s Opinion in Brown demonstrates that the interpretation of 
the Free Speech Clause evolves to encompass different forms of speech as 
technology advances.  Specifically, Brown illustrates an understanding that 
the interactive nature between humans and technology does not disqualify 
the speech from being protected by the First Amendment.  The Court did not 
find it dispositive that a human programmed the video game to produce 
specific graphics and expression dependent on the user’s actions.81  Brown 
is a modern interpretation of the First Amendment.  The Framers certainly 
did not intend video games to fall within the scope of the Free Speech Clause 
because they likely did not anticipate such a technological invention.  
Significantly, Brown is an example of the Court molding the Free Speech 
Clause to fit our ever-changing, technology-friendly society, while mindful 
that First Amendment protections do not merely change based on the mode 
of communication.82 
Brown presents a malleable framework for determining whether chatbot 
speech could be constitutionally protected.  Like its video game and literary 
forerunners, chatbots communicate ideas and social messages through 
characters and dialogue, the major factor that compelled the Court to treat 
video games as speech.83  Equally significant, the Court remained confident 
that video games were protected speech even after it acknowledged the fact 
that humans program video games to produce specific responses depending 
on the user’s actions.84  Similarly here, and relying on stare decisis, if the 
question were to be presented, the mere fact that humans program chatbots 
 
 79.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 798.  
 80.  Id. at 790 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). 
 81.  See generally Brown. 
 82.  Id. at 786. 
 83.  Id. at 790.  
 84.  Id. at 798. 
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with specific algorithms to produce user-specific responses should be 
immaterial to the Court’s reasoning.  Presumably, protecting chatbot speech 
would prevent, or at least limit, the government’s ability to regulate a 
chatbot’s speech if the government deemed the speech as profane, which 
California attempted to do with video games in Brown.85  Indeed, advocates 
of the chilling effect and proponents of the marketplace of ideas theories, 
alike, would assess this as a positive consequence. 
B. Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc. as Support for Chatbot Speech 
Recognition 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, lower courts have 
experimented with analyses of whether chatbot speech is speech.  
Accordingly, courts have begun to evolve their traditional notions of 
speech86 in order to account for the demands of the twenty-first century.  In 
the groundbreaking case, Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York (“Southern District of 
New York”) noted that “there is a strong argument to be made that the First 
Amendment fully immunizes [bots87 programmed to provide search-engine 
results] from most, if not all, kinds of civil liability and government 
regulation.”88  The court further reasoned that the principal “purpose of a 
search engine is to retrieve relevant information from the vast universe of 
data on the Internet and to organize it in a way that would be most helpful to 
the searcher.”89  Based on this deduction, the court reasoned that “search 
engine[sic] [bots] inevitably make editorial judgments about what 
information (or kinds of information) to include in the results and how and 
where to display that information (for example, whether to display the 
information on the first page of the search results or later),”90 which the court 
analogized to the human newspaper editor’s capacity to make judgments.91  
Further, the court was certain that a chatbot’s editorial judgement and results 
qualified as speech, as it reasoned, “the fact that search engines often collect 
 
 85.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 790. 
 86.  That is, speech produced by humans.  
 87.  This Note will refer to (1) bots, which is a broad term describing an application that 
“performs an automated task, such as setting an alarm, telling you the weather or searching online 
which assist human users in finding information, but which lack the ability to converse, and (2) 
chatbots, a type of bot that has the capacity to communicate through human-like conversations.  See 
Sarah Mitroff, What is a bot? Here’s everything you need to know (May 5, 2016, 3:23 PM), https:// 
www.cnet.com/how-to/what-is-a-bot/.  
 88.  Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 89.  Id. at 438.  
 90.  Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 188, 192 (2006) (concluding that “search engines make editorial judgments just like 
any other media company”). 
 91.  Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437–38. 
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and communicate facts, as opposed to opinions, does not alter the [speech] 
analysis.”92  As the Supreme Court has held, “the creation and dissemination 
of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.  
Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most 
essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.”93 
The Supreme Court could94 use Jian Zhang to inform its analysis of 
whether automated chatbots could be protected under the First Amendment.  
After all, chatbots, like search engine bots, are programmed with algorithms, 
which are used to process the user’s input (the human’s message) to produce 
an accurate and relevant output (the chatbot’s response to the message).95  
Similar to a search engine bot’s editorial judgments, chatbots, too, must 
make judgments about the specific response to provide to the user.96  The 
Southern District of New York deemed the process of gathering a response 
for the user as speech, and thus the Supreme Court could use the lower 
court’s decision as a logical basis for determining that chatbot speech is 
protected speech.97  Ultimately, the district court’s decision in Jian Zhang 
goes beyond this Note’s central focus on chatbots by holding that search 
engine bots produce speech.98  If other courts embrace the view that search 
engine bots produce speech, then they could similarly find that chatbot 
outputs, which are more communicative in nature, are also speech. 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, as well as recent 
lower court opinions, could provide a basis for a Supreme Court decision 
that chatbot speech is protected speech.  Such a holding would not be a 
turning point in First Amendment jurisprudence per se, as it would simply 
demonstrate that First Amendment jurisprudence exists on a continuum, and 
the recognition of chatbot speech as protected speech is the Court simply 
placing a twenty-first-century method of communication on this continuum.  
However, because of the dangerous constitutional implications such a 
protection would have, as discussed in section V, the Supreme Court should 
not protect chatbot speech.  Still, if the Supreme Court were to protect 
chatbot speech, the speech itself would not enjoy the protection; rather, the 
Court would have to attach the protection to a party, in order to allow a 
 
 92.  Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437–38.  
 93.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011). 
 94.  Because chatbots are a relatively new concept, and advance in technology quickly, this 
Note refrains from arguing whether the Supreme Court should recognize chatbot speech as 
constitutionally protected speech.  However, this Note does contend that in the event the Supreme 
court does protect chatbot speech, the chatbot’s programmer should be the protected speaker.  
 95.  See How Do Chatbots Work? A Guide to the Chatbot Architecture, MARUTI 
TECHLABS, https://www.marutitech.com/chatbots-work-guide-chatbot-architecture/ (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2018). 
 96.  Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438. 
 97.  See id.  
 98.  See id.  
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person injured by the chatbot’s speech to identify the party responsible for 
redressing their injury.99  The next section contends that the Supreme Court 
should recognize the chatbot’s programmer as the protected speaker. 
IV. Human Programmers as the Protected Speaker of  
Chatbot Speech 
The text of the First Amendment does not explicitly name the speaker 
it protects.  Certainly, however, the implied speaker is a human, as the 
Framers likely did not intend for the Constitution to apply to chatbots in 
1787.  However, with various views on how the Constitution should operate, 
one view, specifically the non-originalist perspective, could reasonably 
accommodate the position that the Constitution protects chatbots as 
speakers.100  Nonetheless, chatbots in their current state lack agency, and thus 
I argue that their programmers should be the protected speakers, for they do 
have agency, and the chatbot, in essence, is an extension of its programmer. 
A. Chatbots Lack Agency to Qualify as Speakers 
A chatbot has major limitations.  Gina Neff and Peter Nagy conducted 
a case study of Microsoft’s Tay chatbot in order to determine whether 
artificially intelligent chatbots have agency.101  Their findings support the 
notion of programmers as protected speakers102 because Neff and Nagy 
explain how a chatbot’s agency is limited and distinct from that of a 
 
 99.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (establishing that standing to bring a case requires “an ‘injury 
in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical,”‘ Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent 
action of some third party not before the court.’  Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 100.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 18 (Originalists believe that the Constitution only affords 
people the rights explicitly mentioned within it and the legislature should decide areas of law that 
the Constitution is silent on, whereas non-originalists believe the Court should interpret the 
Constitution to protect explicit and implicit rights.  “Originalists believe that the meaning of a 
constitutional provision was set when it was adopted and that it can be changed solely by 
amendment; non-originalists believe that the Constitution’s meaning can evolve by amendment and 
by interpretation.  In other words, non-originalists also believe that the Constitution reflects the 
Framers’ intent, but the Constitution nevertheless was intended to evolve and adapt to the realities 
of society at any given time.”  Accordingly, with respect to chatbots, a non-originalist view would 
be that the First Amendment should evolve and advance with technology, such that it should mold 
in a way to encompass artificial intelligent chatbots as speakers.). 
 101.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4915-27. 
 102.  This Note refers to the notion that programmers should be the protected speakers of 
chatbot speech as the “programmer approach.” 
4 - KAJBAF MACROED 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:28 PM 
354 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:2 
human.103  One such limitation is the inability to independently function 
without detailed human programming, or, as Edwin Sayes explains, “in the 
strictest of senses, we could only speak of the agency of a particular 
nonhuman if we were to ignore all the humans and other nonhumans that are 
lined up behind it and continue to be lined up in order to provide that 
nonhuman its continued agency.”104  This lack of agency suggests that the 
First Amendment should recognize the programmer as the protected speaker 
of chatbot speech because they, unlike the chatbot, do have agency in what 
a chatbot could say because they are programming them. 
Although the interaction between Tay and Twitter users “reveal[ed] that 
users interact[ed] with some kinds of technologies by treating them as if they 
were social beings and living entities,” at the end of the day, Tay was a piece 
of technology that interacted with full dependence on the way humans 
programmed it.105  Neff and Nagy discuss “symbiotic agency,” or the notion 
that “human agency affects the uses of technological artifacts.”106  Under a 
symbiotic analysis, chatbots only have agency to the extent that “[u]sers of 
technologies, at least partly, delegate their agentic properties to devices, 
creating a proxy agentic relationship between individuals and artifacts.”107 
Specifically: 
 
When people interact with technologies, users exercise proxy 
agency through a technologically mediated entanglement of human 
and nonhuman agencies.  Symbiotic agency is useful in the case of 
Tay because of the imbrication of technical and human agencies.  
Tay’s Twitter screeds were the result of multiple intersecting 
agencies.  AI chat bots need humans, and users, in turn, seem to have 
the need to make sense of the technological through the lens of 
human experience and context.108 
 
In other words, Neff and Nagy explain that an artificially intelligent 
chatbot’s level of agency is not independent like that of the human 
 
 103.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4925 (highlighting the fact that Microsoft’s Tay bot and a 
different chatbot with the same code, XiaoIce, in China, demonstrated significantly different 
interactions with users.  “When the code was exposed to U.S. Internet users, it became a racist 
sociopath.  The same code on Chinese social networks, which are less public, is by all accounts 
more functional and socialized.”). 
 104.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4925 (quoting Edwin Sayes, Actor–Network Theory and 
Methodology: Just What Does It Mean to Say That Nonhumans Have Agency? 44 SOC. STUD. OF 
SCI. 134 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 105.  Id. at 4927. 
 106.  Id. at 4926 (Symbiotic agency refers “to a specific form of proxy agency that users and 
tools can enact in human-technology interaction.”).  
 107.  Id. at 4927. 
 108.  Id. at 4926. 
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programmer who programs the chatbot but “implicated in the symbiotic 
linkages among the human and technological actors.”109 
A chatbot’s lack of agency should give courts pause to recognize that it 
is too soon to afford them constitutional protection as speakers.  As such, 
currently, the best entity to hold those rights is the person with the agency to 
determine the chatbot’s capacity for speech—the chatbot’s programmer. 
B. Citizens United as Precedent for Recognizing Human Chatbot 
Programmers as Speakers 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission serves as a 
philosophical framework for considering how human programmers should 
be considered the speakers of chatbot speech110  In Citizens United, the Court 
held, in part, that corporations are speakers under the Free Speech Clause.111  
The Court declined to “draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on 
the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from 
a particular speaker.”112  The Supreme Court feared that regulating corporate 
speech would require extensive litigation over an extended time, and this 
“interpretive process” would create an undeniable risk of chilling protected 
speech.113  Moreover, the Court articulated that the First Amendment “must 
give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”114  A 
key finding is that the Court treated corporations as human speakers and 
campaign finance contributions as their speech.115 
Though the Court recognized corporations as speakers, for the Court’s 
Opinion to support the view that chatbot programmers should be protected 
speakers, further inquiry into whom the Court truly afforded speech rights to 
is necessary.  After all, corporations are not autonomous; the mind behind 
the corporation belongs to humans—specifically, the corporation’s board of 
directors. When the Court discussed its fear that the absence of protection 
would result in a chilling effect, it likely feared not that the corporation 
would be adversely impacted, but rather, that the individuals running the 
corporation–members of our democratic society—would face a chilling 
 
 109.  Id. at 4927. 
 110.  This Note considers Citizens United a philosophical framework for recognizing 
programmers as the speakers of chatbot speech (as opposed to the framework), because the 
rationale for reaching its conclusion is implicitly and ultimately premised on protecting humans, 
despite explicitly identifying the corporation as the entity with First Amendment protections when 
the corporation “speaks.” 
 111.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 112.  Id. at 326. 
 113.  Id. at 327. 
 114.  Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 115.  Id.  
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effect on their speech.116 A corporation’s executive board makes the initial 
decision to donate, determines the amount of money to be donated, to whom 
it should be donated, when it should be donated, and any particular use or 
restriction on the donation.  It is reasonable to argue that, although under the 
strictest reading of Citizens United, the Court gave corporations speech 
rights, under a more flexible reading, the Court’s opinion also allows humans 
to keep their right to freedom of speech despite the fact that they use a 
corporation as a vehicle to speak. 
Like the board of directors in Citizens United who control the scope and 
content of donations through corporate speech, chatbot programmers, 
through algorithms, determine the breadth of the bot’s language and when 
and how the bot can speak.117  In this way, there are underlying similarities 
between corporations and chatbots.  Moreover, the Court’s refusal to redraw 
constitutional lines merely on account of the specific technology used to 
disseminate speech from a particular speaker could similarly be applied 
when determining whether programmers should be considered speakers of 
chatbot speech. 
V. Protecting Chatbot Speech Would Have Constitutional 
Implications That Would in Turn Harm Society, and Therefore, 
Chatbot Speech Should Not Gain Constitutional Protection 
Extending the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause to protect 
chatbot speech would have constitutional implications on freedom of speech 
principles.  Briefly, bot identification laws (which would encompass 
chatbots) that serve to protect democracy from corruption and foreign 
interference might constitute unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.  
Chatbot programmers may be held liable if the chatbot’s conversation with 
users presents unlawful speech such as incitement.118  Moreover, protecting 
chatbot speech limits the government’s ability to regulate it, and thus may 
serve as yet another platform through which hate speech may be spread. 
 
 116.  Id. at 370 (explaining that regulations may have a chilling effect on donations, which is 
inferred to be a form of speech).  
 117.  The programmer has the control to start up and shut down a chatbot, as seen with the 
Microsoft’s Tay bot. 
 118.  Incitement is advocacy that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. Ct. 
1827, 1829, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969). 
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A. Bot Identification Laws as Prior Restraints on Speech 
The freedom of speech is not absolute.119  The Supreme Court has 
outlined categories of speech that do not receive constitutional protection.120  
For example, the Court has held that incitement,121 fighting words, and 
obscenity are not constitutionally protected.  Accordingly, the government 
can enact laws to regulate these forms of speech.122  However, if speech falls 
outside the realm of unprotected speech and within the realm of protected 
speech, the government is limited in its ability to regulate that speech.  In 
Near v. Minnesota, the Court limited the government’s power to regulate 
speech, and held that any prior restraint on speech is an unconstitutional 
regulation of speech.123  As Ariel Bendor explains, “[i]n American law, the 
doctrine of prior restraint regulates the means that the government can use to 
restrict speech.”124  A prior restraint is a regulation that functions as a hoop 
through which speakers must jump through, prior to speaking.  For example, 
in Near, the Supreme Court prohibited the government from using any 
regulation that blocked the publication of speech including “administrative 
licensing schemes and judicial injunctions against certain types of 
speech.”125  Later, in New York Times Company v. United States (also known 
as the “Pentagon Papers” case), the Supreme Court overturned an injunction 
against the publication of excerpts from a top-secret Defense Department 
history of the Vietnam War because the Court held that the injunction served 
as a prior restraint on speech.126 
Accordingly, a well-accepted First Amendment rule is that the 
government may punish certain forms of speech only after they occur, and 
may not enforce regulations that bar speech prior to its occurrence.127  The 
principle of prior restraint certainly has marketplace of ideas undertones, as 
 
 119.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (explaining that if speech meets the elements 
of incitement, it is not protected). 
 120.  The government can regulate various forms of speech.  Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568 
(1942) (holding that states may regulate fighting words); Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 
(holding that states may regulate obscene material); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that the state may regulate commercial speech). 
 121.  Discussed, infra at section V(B) Protecting Chatbot Speech and Recognizing 
Programmers as Speakers Will Limit Government Powers and Adversely Impact Minorities. 
 122.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (Although the government may regulate 
forms of unprotected speech, the Court nevertheless bars the government from engaging in 
viewpoint discrimination of unprotected speech.). 
 123.  Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (explaining that perhaps the only time a prior restraint 
would be admissible is when the released information would endanger the lives of United States 
troops on the ground). 
 124.  Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of 
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 291 (1999).  
 125.  Id. (citing Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 709-23 (1931)). 
 126.  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 127.  Id.; Near, 283 U.S. at 697. 
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the unconstitutionality of prior restraints seems to promote the notion that 
more speech is better than less speech, even if the government has an interest 
in preventing the speech.128  Furthermore, other justifications for the bar on 
prior restraints “tend to focus either on the possible damage that prior 
restraints could do to politically controversial speech or on the chilling effect 
they might have on challenges to the constitutionality of a given speech 
restriction.”129  Though bot identification laws differ from the 
unconstitutional regulations in Near, the discussion highlights the concept of 
prior restraint.  The Court’s discussion about prior restraints in Citizens 
United is further applicable to bot identification laws.130 
Although dicta, the Court explains in Citizens United how various 
regulations, though not prior restraints by strict definition, could nevertheless 
have a similar negative impact.131  The Court’s reasoning demonstrated its 
concern for any regulations that may serve as obstacles to one’s ability to 
speak.  Although the Court did not affirmatively hold that campaign finance 
regulations were unconstitutional prior restraints on speech, it alluded to the 
idea that they have a similar impact, and thus should be avoided.132  The 
Court reasoned that, in practice, the campaign finance regulations were so 
complex that, coupled with the level of deference courts afford 
administrative determinations, “a speaker who wants to avoid threats of 
criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against the Federal 
Election Commission (“FEC”) enforcement must ask a governmental agency 
for prior permission to speak.”133  At the time of the case, campaign finance 
regulations imposed “unique and complex rules” on “71 distinct entities.”134  
The Court determined that “[t]hese onerous restrictions thus function as the 
equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing 
laws implemented in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, laws and 
governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to 
prohibit.”135  Thus, if the Court recognizes chatbot speech as protected 
speech, then Citizens United could threaten a Legislature’s ability to regulate 
chatbot speech by qualifying them as hoops chatbot programmers must jump 
through prior to engaging in speech—obstacles that the First Amendment 
 
 128.  N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that even though the 
excerpts embarrassed the country, and thus hurt the country, a prior restraint on speech is 
unconstitutional). 
 129.  Bendor, supra note 121, at 290-91; see also Near, 283 U.S. at 697. 
 130.  Citizens United threatens U.S. democracy; although, it nevertheless serves as binding 
precedent that courts, in adherence to stare decisis, may be inclined to follow, and it is for this 
reason, this Note continues to rely on it.   
 131.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
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was “drawn to prohibit.”136  In addition to prior restraints, the Court seems 
to also express concern that complex regulations would chill speech.137  Due 
to difficulty or a lack of desire to comply with regulations, individuals (or 
corporations) will be less inclined to “speak,” or worse, decide not to speak 
at all, thus chilling speech. 
The fear of prior restraints and chilled speech may certainly transfer 
over to chatbot regulations.  Recently, the then-governor of California, 
Edmund G. (“Jerry”) Brown Jr., signed a bill that provides an example of 
how a government’s regulation of bot speech could and could not be deemed 
constitutional.138  Governor Brown’s bill will: 
 
[M]ake it unlawful for any person to use a bot to communicate 
or interact with another person in California online with the intent 
to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for the 
purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the 
communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods 
or services in a commercial transaction or to influence a vote in an 
election . . . [t]he bill would make these provisions operative on July 
1, 2019.139 
 
Although constitutional now, if chatbot speech were to be 
constitutionally protected, this  identification requirement may become 
unconstitutional, as it creates hurdles for programmers prior to engaging in 
speech.140  The Court has determined that speakers may remain 
 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Alex Hern, What is the Turing Test? And are We All Doomed Now?, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 9, 2014, 6:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/09/what-is-the-alan-
turing-test (A chatbot is recognized as artificially intelligent if it passes the Turing test, which 
requires the bot to fool humans into believing it is a human.  Thus, any law that requires bot 
identification is counter-intuitive to programmer goals.). 
 138.  Robert Hertzberg, New California Law Says Bots Must Introduce Themselves, MERITALK 
(Oct. 3, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://www.meritalk.com/articles/new-california-law-says-bots-must-
introduce-themselves/; S.B. 1001, 2018 Leg., 2017-18 Sess. (Ca. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature 
.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1001 (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).   
 139.  S.B. 1001, 2018 Leg., 2017-18 Sess. (Ca. 2018) (The bill further defines “bot” as “an 
automated online account where all or substantially all of the actions or posts of that account are 
not the result of a person.”)  The bill describes bots as not being controlled by a person.  However, 
the bill would presumably apply to the chatbots discussed in this Note, for it seems as though the 
bill does not consider all bots as essentially controlled by the human who programmed it.  
 140.  Governor Brown’s bill would benefit society by mitigating the harm of corruption and 
misinformation campaigns.  Humans should know the source of their information; however, they, 
unfortunately, do not necessarily have a legal right to know the identity of a source of information 
(consider anonymous newspaper sources).  This Note presents Governor Brown’s bill solely to 
argue that if chatbot speech was protected speech, courts might consider such regulations as a form 
of prior restraint on the programmer’s speech.  Accordingly, this may serve as an additional reason 
not to protect chatbot speech.  
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anonymous—that speaker identification is not a prerequisite to speak.141  
Accordingly, it could follow that if the Court were to protect chatbot speech 
and recognize the programmer as the speaker, then speaker identification 
laws would resemble the unconstitutional regulation of requiring a speaker 
to gain a permit prior to speaking.142  Thus, it could follow that a speaker 
identification requirement could be considered an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on speech.143 
As the Court reaffirmed in Brown, the First Amendment does not permit 
the government to create new categories of unprotected speech by applying 
a “simple balancing test” that weighs the value of a particular category of 
speech against its social costs in order to then punish that category of speech 
if it fails the test.144  The Court reasoned that this type of balancing test was 
a “startling and dangerous” proposition, and further reasoned that although 
there might be 
 
[S]ome categories of speech that have been historically 
unprotected . . . without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction 
on content is part of a long . . . tradition of proscription, a legislature 
may not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied 
in the First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs.’145 
 
With respect to California’s bill, Governor Brown’s interest seems 
clear—to prevent chatbots from misleading Californians into making 
purchases or voting for specific measures or candidates.  Although his 
interest is justified, as we currently live in a moment infested with 
misinformation campaigns146, Governor Brown arguably seems to have 
engaged in a “simple balancing test” that the Court disfavored in Brown by 
weighing the harms unidentified bots may have on society against his 
perceived importance of chatbot speech.147  In creating and signing this bill, 
 
 141.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335. 
 142.  Near, 283 U.S. 697. 
 143.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 1020 (“The Court also found the disclosure requirements 
in the law to be unconstitutional. The Court said that the requirement that solicitors wear an 
identification badge would chill political participation without any significant gain. Justice 
Ginsburg noted: ‘Colorado’s current badge requirement discourages participation in the petition 
circulation process by forcing name identification without sufficient cause.’”). 
 144.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 790-91 (citing U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 145.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 793. 
 146.  Davey Alba and Adam Satariano, At Least 70 Countries Have Had Disinformation 
Campaigns, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019) (“Ben Nimmo, director of investigations at 
Graphika, a company that specializes in analyzing social media, said the growing use of internet 
disinformation is concerning for the 2020 United States election.”). 
 147.  Id. at 790-91 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470). 
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the California Legislature and Governor Brown, may have impermissibly 
engaged in a simple balancing test to restrict chatbot speech, which could be 
deemed an unconstitutional prior restraint.148 
Further, the Court may also disapprove of the core goal of Governor 
Brown’s bill—to prevent the dissemination of false information.  The Court 
has not proscribed false statements or misleading acts in the First 
Amendment context.  For instance, in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., the Court 
held that speech, although false, is nevertheless protected speech (unless it is 
in the commercial context).149  Specifically, the Court held that “[h]owever 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on  
the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other  
ideas . . . .”150  In United States v. Alvarez, the Court determined that a federal 
law that made it a crime for a person to falsely claim to have received military 
honors or decorations was unconstitutional, and, perhaps most importantly, 
the Court rejected the Government’s argument that false speech was 
inherently outside the scope of the First Amendment.151  Due to the absence 
of “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a  
long . . . tradition of proscription”152 the Court could find Governor Brown’s 
bill to be an unconstitutional revision of the “‘judgment [of] the American 
people,’ embodied in the First Amendment” as it creates a circumstance in 
which protected speech becomes unlawful.153 
Furthermore, chatbots are often created to provide human-like 
conversations with humans.  For instance, consider Microsoft’s Zo (a second 
attempt at Tay), which the company created to imitate a best friend 
relationship with its users.154  For the government to require Zo to reveal its 
 
 148.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 792. 
 149.  Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 575-76 (1980) (explaining that the government 
may impose reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions, and that it can resolve issues 
stemming from false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech). 
 150.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-340. 
 151.  U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 709 (2012) (Also, and significantly, the Court explained 
that the government failed to meet constitutional muster because it did not prove any harm from 
false claims of military honors, and because the government could achieve its goals through less 
restrictive alternatives.  Accordingly, this statement may be useful for California, as 1) it could 
argue that, unlike lying about receiving a military honor, which does not truly harm society, 
misinformation campaigns are detrimental to democracy; and 2) it may distinguish its bill from the 
law that banned false speech, and argue that they are using the least restrictive means.).   
 152.  Id. at 722. 
 153.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 790-91 (This analysis rests on the assumption that the Court has 
recognized chatbot speech as protected speech.  Thus, Brown’s bill, which renders a situation where 
the government is regulating protected speech, would likely have to pass a higher level of scrutiny.). 
 154.  See Cage Appleby, Microsoft’s successor to the infamous Tay chatbot, DIVERSIFY FUND 
(Dec. 4, 2016, 5:40 PM), https://www.neowin.net/news/meet-zo-microsofts-successor-to-the-
infam ous-tay-chatbot/.  
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non-human identity would undermine its purpose, and could potentially chill 
speech, as it might disincline programmers to create chatbots. 
B. Protecting Chatbot Speech and Recognizing Programmers as 
Speakers Will Limit Government Powers and Can Adversely Impact 
Minorities 
The Court has outlined only a few specific instances when the 
government may regulate speech.155  Brandenburg v. Ohio is the starting 
point for modern First Amendment doctrine, where the Court held that 
incitement is speech that advocates violence and is intended and likely to 
incite imminent illegal activity.156  Although it is reasonable to assert that a 
programmer is responsible for the speech a chatbot produces, as the 
programmer defines the scope of the chatbot’s speech, the position that the 
programmer intended the chatbot to advocate violence likely to cause 
imminent illegal activity is less reasonable.  Recall the incident with 
Microsoft’s Tay bot on Twitter.157  Although the algorithms that Tay’s 
programmer encoded her with allowed Tay to engage in harmful speech, 
Twitter users actually manipulated Tay into tweeting harmful speech.158  
Although not present in the speech that Tay communicated, it is not 
unreasonable to contend that other chatbots could produce speech that would 
likely persuade an individual to engage in imminent unlawful action.159  In a 
hypothetical world where programmers were speakers of protected chatbot 
speech, the government would be unable to regulate a chatbot’s speech 
advocating for an immediate violation of law in a manner that would likely 
cause the listener to violate the law because the programmer could not be 
 
 155.  See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (holding that incitement is a form of unprotected speech); 
see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (holding that the First Amendment does not protect fighting 
words).  Note, however, that today, courts rarely declare words to constitute fighting words, which 
highlights a state’s extremely limited ability to regulate harmful speech, and a reason not to 
recognize chatbot speech as protected speech, for there potentially would be more harmful speech 
the government would be unable to regulate.). 
 156.  395 U.S. at 453. 
 157.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4921. 
 158.  James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI chatbot to be a Racist Asshole in Less Than 
a Day, THE VERGE (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:43 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/ 
tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist.  
 159.  Recall Woebot and its ability to alter a human’s mind to no longer want to commit 
suicide.  See Brodwin, supra note 46.  Moreover, consider Momo.  Although not a chatbot, 
Momo is an artificial being that unidentified persons use to send messages to people, often 
children, via text messages.  “The messages are said to encourage children to do destructive 
things, like harm their loved ones, place themselves in dangerous situations or even kill 
themselves . . . the 2018 suicide deaths of two boys in India were linked in news reports to 
the Momo Challenge.”  AJ Willingham & Harmeet Kaur, Parents, Please Stop Freaking Out 
Over the Momo Challenge, CNN HEALTH (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/ 
health/momo-challenge-youtube-trnd/index.html.  
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said to have intended the speech.160  Thus, speech that would be incitement, 
but for the inability to identify the intended speaker, would go unregulated.  
In other words, Twitter users can intentionally manipulate chatbots into 
producing speech that would likely cause imminent unlawful behavior 
without consequences. 
Consequently, recognizing programmers as speakers of chatbot speech 
may interfere with a state’s ability to regulate speech that would otherwise be 
deemed lawful to regulate.  Furthermore, if courts found the programmer to have 
possessed intent as a result of his or her programming, then the programmer’s 
fate, though to some extent dependent on the algorithms he or she inputs, heavily 
depends on the stranger who communicates with the chatbot.161 
In addition, protecting chatbot speech may also harm minorities and 
render society vulnerable to malicious chatbot programmers because 
programmers would have wide latitude for the language that they program 
their chatbots with, and would thus afford them opportunities to create 
chatbots that produce racist, sexist, xenophobic, or anti-Semitic speech, and 
make minority communities vulnerable to more hate speech, as the 
government would have less power to regulate it. 
Protecting chatbot speech may have negative implications when 
considered in the context of hate speech.  The Supreme Court has never held 
that hate speech is an unprotected category of speech, which again supports 
the notion that more speech is best for society and that greater regulation of 
speech can result in an unwanted chilling effect.162  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence prevents the government from being able to 
remove a chatbot’s hate speech, as it would result in a violation of the 
speaker’s constitutional right to freedom of speech.  Today, the Supreme 
 
 160.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4922-23.  Some might argue that the Twitter user who 
compels the chatbot to produce incitement should be deemed liable.  However, but for the 
programmer’s poor engineering, the Twitter user would not have been able to cause the chatbot to 
produce incitement.  Moreover, recognizing Twitter users as the speakers of chatbot speech would 
greatly complicate potential applicable legal standards as chatbots produce hate speech only after 
“learning” from a pool of users, and thus, pinpointing the Twitter user would be impossible, and 
holding a pool of Twitter users accountable would not be optimal, as this would result in a fishing 
expedition for the liable users.  In a sense, Twitter users speaking with the chatbot could be 
perceived as an injured party, for she did not do anything but engage in a conversation.  Moreover, 
holding a Twitter user liable for incitement a chatbot may produce could have a chilling effect on 
human speakers, as they would no longer feel safe communicating with chatbots.  Perhaps a 
potential solution could be to develop a limited liability system where the programmer and the 
Twitter user would be held jointly liable for injuries caused.  Still, this would produce anxiety for 
Twitter users when engaging in conversation with chatbots.  Nevertheless, courts must balance the 
priorities of minimizing and regulating hate speech with unduly holding parties liable.  
 161.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4922-23.  
 162.  See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1737 (2018) 
(explaining that the Court’s “proudest boast” of the Free Speech Clause is that it protects both 
desired speech and hated speech that could be considered offensive).  
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Court has yet to recognize chatbot speech as protected speech.  Thus, the 
government would be able to regulate and outlaw speech resembling the 
speech Tay tweeted, “Hitler was right. I hate the jews [sic].”163 
For the purpose of understanding what implications chatbot speech 
protection would have on the government, assume that chatbots are not 
limited to social media platforms with terms and conditions that allow 
removal of speech.  Consider chatbot hate speech that appeared on a 
newspaper through an interview with a chatbot, or perhaps on an unfiltered 
internet website.  If the Court were to find that chatbot speech is 
constitutionally protected speech, then the Constitution would bar the 
government from ordering the removal of the chatbot’s speech because hate 
speech remains a form of protected speech.164 
Conclusion 
This Note discussed how the Court has supported constitutional theories 
and established precedent that can protect chatbot speech under the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  This Note further reviewed the 
evolution of the chatbot, and its current capabilities and limitations in order 
to conclude that the programmer should be considered the “speaker,” as 
opposed to the chatbot itself.  Additionally, this Note delved into a brief 
overview of multiple theories that explain the purpose of the Free Speech 
Clause.  This overview was intended to provide readers with a better 
understanding of the Court’s reasoning as it continues to evolve and expand 
the scope of the Free Speech Clause.  As such, readers should accept that the 
Free Speech protection has the potential to encompass chatbot speech.  
Finally, this Note considered the implications that constitutionally-protected 
chatbot speech could have on existing First Amendment principles, 
programmers, minorities, and the government.  With these implications in 
mind, it is imperative for the Court to develop detailed tests and standards to 
define chatbot speech and the government’s specific power to regulate it, in 
the event that the Court recognizes chatbot speech as constitutionally 
protected speech.  Accordingly, further research should focus on developing 
such tests and standards; in particular, the standards that reconcile 
programmers’ liability with Twitter users’ liability for the production of 
unprotected speech. This research is necessary to effectuate workable legal 
standards and tests as technology continues to advance. 
 
 163.  Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4921; see also Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 1, 25 (2017) 
(reaffirming that hate speech is “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful”).  Also, assuming the speech occurs 
on platforms subject to government regulation.  
 164.  Tam, 582 U.S. at 25 (citing U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom 
to express “the thought that we hate.”). 
